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Analyst Information Discovery and Interpretation Roles:     





This study examines analyst information intermediary roles using a textual analysis of analyst 
reports and corporate disclosures. We employ a topic modeling methodology from computational 
linguistic research to compare the thematic content of a large sample of analyst reports issued 
promptly after earnings conference calls with the content of the calls themselves. We show that 
analysts discuss exclusive topics beyond those from conference calls and interpret topics from 
conference calls. In addition, we find that investors place a greater value on new information in 
analyst reports when managers face greater incentives to withhold value-relevant information. 
Analyst interpretation is particularly valuable when the processing costs of conference call 
information increase. Finally, we document that investors react to analyst report content that 
simply confirms managers’ conference call discussions. Overall, our study shows that analysts 
play the information intermediary roles by discovering information beyond corporate disclosures 
and by clarifying and confirming corporate disclosures.  
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1. Introduction  
Financial analysts play an important information intermediary role in capital markets. The 
culmination of their efforts are the research reports distributed to investors, which contain several 
quantitative summary measures, including earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, and target prices, 
as well as a textual discussion about the company. This textual discussion covers a wide range of topics, 
such as the company’s current and future financial performance, recent corporate events, business 
strategies, management effectiveness, competitive landscape, and macroeconomic environment. Extant 
literature generally suggests that these analyst outputs provide value to capital market participants (e.g., 
Bradley et al. 2014; Huang et al. 2014; Li et al. 2015). To advance the literature, several review papers 
(Ramnath et al. 2008; Beyer et al. 2010; and Bradshaw 2011) call for additional research to better 
understand the sources of analyst value. 
This study investigates how financial analysts serve their information intermediary role by conducting 
a large-scale comparison of the textual content of analyst research reports to that of closely preceding 
corporate disclosures. Specifically, we employ a topic modeling method to compare the thematic content 
of a large sample of analyst reports issued on the day of and the day following quarterly earnings 
conference calls (hereafter, prompt reports) to that of managers’ narratives in these conference calls. 
Quarterly earnings announcements and their related conference calls are arguably the most important 
corporate disclosures. Accordingly, an overwhelming number of sell-side analyst research reports are 
issued immediately following these corporate events, because only timely reactions to these events can 
offer the analyst clients an informational advantage in trading.1 The textual comparison allows us to 
investigate the following questions: (1) What type of information do analysts provide in prompt reports? 
(2) Do analyst discussions of new topics and of conference call topics provide incremental value to 
investors? And (3) under what conditions do analyst reports provide more value to investors?  
                                                            
1 Indeed, we find that 46.5% of analyst revision reports are prompt reports. An All-Star analyst from a large 
brokerage house we interviewed commented that “the market is efficient but impatient. Analysts need to feed the 
market with prompt reaction to management’s thinking and outlook guidance. In addition, competition forces 
everyone to issue reports quickly; otherwise their reports may not be read by clients.” 
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As information intermediaries, analysts can provide value to investors in two ways: First, through 
their private research efforts, they collect and generate information that is otherwise not readily available 
to investors; second, they could facilitate investors’ understanding of the existing public information by 
analyzing and clarifying it and by offering their own opinions on issues raised through public disclosures. 
Following the literature (e.g., Ivković and Jegadeesh 2004; Chen et al. 2010), we term these efforts the 
analyst information discovery role and the analyst information interpretation role, respectively.  
Several sources of potential value can arise from the analyst information discovery role: Analysts 
conduct their own private research and channel checks, for example, by visiting stores and warehouses, 
investigating supply chains, and surveying customers;2 they have private interactions with not only CEOs 
and CFOs, but also division-level managers from operating regions and product lines (Soltes 2014); they 
package information collected from multiples sources, such as other information intermediaries, peer firms 
in the industry, independent research agencies, and government agencies, and undertake original analysis 
by “connecting the dots”; and they generate new information signals, such as firms’ valuations, earnings 
forecasts, and long-term growth rates, using their high level of financial expertise. In our setting, discovery 
reflects analysts’ private efforts to generate new topics that are otherwise not readily available in the 
conference call, but the sources of the information can include a variety of public and private channels.  
We consider analysts as serving an information interpretation role when they discuss topics that have 
already been discussed in the recent corporate disclosure. Similar to the media’s providing value through 
information dissemination or rebroadcasting, as shown by recent research (e.g., Miller 2006; Bushee et al. 
2010; Drake et al. 2014), analysts might be able to provide value by discussing these conference call 
topics. First, by interpreting only the relevant topics in corporate disclosures, analysts attract and direct 
investors’ limited attention to what they view as being important.3 Second, analysts can clarify managers’ 
                                                            
2 For example, in a Morgan Stanley report issued on August 12, 2011, immediately after J.C. Penney’s conference 
call, an analyst alludes to a consumer survey: “The top reason consumers say they shop JCP is due to ‘low prices, 
great discounts’ (as per our most recent consumer survey).”  
3 This point is supported by the All-Star analyst we interviewed, who mentioned that “some topics discussed during 
call are ignored by analysts. Only those ‘valuable’ topics are picked up and interpreted.”  
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disclosure by using their own language, offering their opinions on issues raised by managers, and 
quantitatively assessing management’s subjective statements. Third, perceived as independent agents, 
analysts can enhance the reliability of statements from managers, who may suffer from agency problems. 
Taken together, we posit that the analyst information interpretation role helps investors understand 
corporate disclosures better by lowering processing costs and enhancing information quality. Whether and 
when investors consider these information roles as being useful are empirical questions our study attempts 
to address. 
A few studies compare the relative value of the analyst information roles based on the market reaction 
to analyst earnings forecasts and stock recommendations (Ivković and Jegadeesh 2004; Chen et al. 2010; 
and Livnat and Zhang 2012). These studies infer analyst information roles from the timing of the analyst 
revisions relative to corporate disclosures. That is, they assume that analyst forecast revisions following 
(preceding) public announcements are more likely to reflect their information interpretation (discovery) 
role. We extend this stream of literature by introducing a new textual technique to construct explicit 
measures of analyst information roles that have been traditionally inferred from the quantitative research 
outputs of analysts. Specifically, we partition the discussion in analyst reports into a discussion of topics 
already covered in the immediately preceding calls and a discussion of new topics. The former likely 
provides an interpretation of the information already contained in the calls, based on which we assess the 
analyst information interpretation role; the latter likely provides information beyond what managers had 
released publicly, based on which we assess the analyst information discovery role. To extract 
economically meaningful topics from a large sample of analyst reports and conference calls, we exploit a 
topic modeling approach called Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), an advanced textual analysis 
technique that uncovers underlying topics in a large set of documents based on the statistical correlations 
among words in these documents (Blei et al. 2003). 
Our empirical measures of the analyst information roles are based on a comparison of the thematic 
content of 159,210 prompt analyst reports (denoted as ) to that of manager narratives in a sample of 
4 
 
17,750 earnings conference calls (denoted as ).4 We first employ LDA to extract topics from  and 
 and then conduct a battery of validity tests to verify the effectiveness of LDA in identifying 
economically interpretable topics. When we compare the thematic content of  and , we find that 
analysts spend an average of 31% of their discussion on exclusive topics that receive little or no mention 
by managers, and thus 69% of their discussion focuses on conference topics. This suggests that both 
analyst information discovery and interpretation roles are substantial.  
Next, we find that investor reactions to both information roles are economically significant and 
incremental to their reaction to the conference call information and earnings news. To better understand 
the sources of analyst value, we predict and find that investor reaction to the analyst information 
discovery role is more pronounced when managers face greater incentives to withhold value-relevant 
information (i.e., when firms have greater proprietary cost, face higher litigation risk, or experience bad 
performance) and that investor reaction to the analyst interpretation role is greater when the conference 
call information has higher processing costs (i.e., when the call contains a greater amount of uncertain or 
qualitative statements, or does not deliver bad news).  
We shed further light on the interplay between analyst reports and corporate disclosures by 
documenting that analysts respond to investor demand and exert more effort to serve in either information 
role depending on the features of the corporate disclosures. Specifically, analysts increase the amount of 
information discovery when managers are more likely to withhold information, and analysts use a greater 
amount of their own language to clarify management disclosures (as opposed to merely repeating 
managers’ words) when the cost of processing management disclosure is higher. An additional analysis 
shows that investors value analysts’ efforts. That is, the value of each information role increases with the 
length of the discussion; the interpretation’s value increases further when analysts use their own language 
to discuss conference call topics.  
                                                            
4 Conference call narratives include manager discussions in both the presentation and the question and answer 




Finally, we demonstrate that analysts sometimes engage in confirming what managers say in the 
conference calls. Within the 69% of the discussion in prompt reports that is devoted to interpreting 
conference call topics, 23% does not entail a different vocabulary from that used by managers. Although 
such confirming discussions are unlikely to contain new insights or provide greater clarity than managers’ 
original discussions, we find that the investor reaction to them are significant, albeit having a 
considerably smaller economic magnitude than that of analysts’ discovery or interpretation using their 
own language. This evidence suggests that even when analysts selectively repeat management 
disclosures, they provide confirming value by identifying and disseminating the useful conference call 
topics to their clients (i.e., confirming these topics’ importance and relevance) and by enhancing the 
credibility of managers’ statements (i.e., confirming these topics’ validity).  
Our study provides several contributions to the literature. First, we provide new insight into the 
sources of analyst value as an information intermediaries and extend our understanding on the interplay 
between analyst research and corporate disclosures. In particular, we document the value of analyst 
discovery and interpretation roles immediately after corporate disclosure events and identify the economic 
conditions under which each role provides value to investors. These economic conditions relate to the 
features of earnings conference calls, including managers’ tendency to withhold information during the 
calls and the processing costs of the calls’ information. Second, our study introduces a textual 
measurement of information content to the literature, which is based on comparing the discussions of 
economically meaningful topics in analyst reports and management disclosures. Finally, our study 
contributes to the emerging area of textual analysis by introducing the topic modeling approach to the 
accounting and finance literature and validating the approach for financial documents (see a recent review 
by Loughran and McDonald 2016). Much of this research focuses on the textual characteristics (e.g., 
readability and tone) of corporate financial disclosures (e.g., Management Discussion and Analysis in 10-
K, and S-1). Our topic modeling methodology provides another avenue through which researchers can 
expand their analyses of the textual content of corporate financial disclosures from “how texts are being 
said” to “what is being said” in these disclosures.  
6 
 
2. Topic modeling and Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) 
We obtain our empirical measures of analyst information intermediary roles by comparing the 
textual narratives in  to those in  at the topic level. To identify topics, we use LDA, which is 
developed by Blei et al. (2003) and has become a widely used topic modeling algorithm. LDA uses a 
statistical generative model to imitate the process of how a human writes a document. Specifically, LDA 
assumes that each word in a document is generated in two steps. First, assuming that each document has 
its own topic distribution, a topic is randomly drawn based on the document’s topic distribution. Next, 
assuming that each topic has its own word distribution, a word is randomly drawn from the word 
distribution of the topic selected in the previous step. Repeating these two steps word by word generates a 
document. The LDA algorithm discovers the topic distribution for each document and the word 
distribution of each topic iteratively, by fitting this two-step generative model to the observed words in 
the documents until it finds the best set of variables that describe the topic and word distributions. 
Essentially, LDA reduces the extraordinary dimensionality of linguistic data from words to topics, based 
on word co-occurrences in the same document, similar to cluster analysis or principal component analysis 
applied to quantitative data. Appendix I and Internet Appendix I provide a detailed discussion of the 
intuition and technical features of LDA, respectively.   
LDA offers several advantages over manual coding. First, it is capable of processing a massive 
collection of documents that would be too costly to code manually. Second, LDA provides a reliable and 
replicable classification of topics. Neither of these features can be attained with manual coding, which 
relies on human coders’ subjective judgment. Third, LDA does not require researchers to pre-specify 
rules or keywords for the underlying taxonomy of categories. Topics and their probabilistic relations with 
keywords are discovered by LDA from fitting the assumed statistical model to an entire textual corpus. In 
contrast, manual coding or dictionary methods require researchers to pre-specify a deterministic set of 
rules or keywords to categorize topics. It is close to impossible to determine a priori the topics across all 
documents, the keywords that identify each topic for an entire textual corpus, or the probabilistic relation 
between keywords and topics.  
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To allow the LDA algorithm to fully identify the topic structure, we use all available earnings 
conference calls (18,607 transcripts obtained from Thomson Reuter’s StreetEvents Database) and analyst 
reports (476,633 analyst reports obtained from Thomson Reuter’s Investext Database) for S&P 500 firms 
during the 2003-2012 period.5 As described in detail in Appendix II, prior to applying the LDA algorithm, 
we conduct several preprocessing steps to clean and parse the textual data. We conduct the LDA analysis 
for each industry separately, because many topics are industry-specific. The total number of topics for 
each industry is set at 60 based on the analysis of the Perplexity Score (discussed in Appendix II). The 
LDA outputs clusters of words in each topic, as well as the words’ probabilistic relation with each topic. 
In mathematical form, it comprises a matrix of word probabilities in each topic. Using this matrix, we 
assign each sentence in our documents to the most likely topic, by summing up the probabilities of its 
words in each topic and assigning the sentence to the topic with the highest probability. 
Validation of LDA outputs 
We provide several validation tests for the LDA topic outputs. First, following the procedure in 
Quinn et al. (2010), Atkins et al. (2012), and Bao and Datta (2012), we manually read the high-probability 
words in key topics and their respective sentences, to provide a short and intuitive label for each topic. 
These labels are intended to validate that LDA is able to discern the underlying economic content of the 
topics.6 Table 1 presents the twenty most frequent words in each of the top ten topics in the Capital Goods 
and Health Care Equipment and Services industries.7  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Overall, the results in Table 1 validate the effectiveness of the LDA algorithm in identifying distinct, 
economically meaningful topics in conference calls and analyst reports. For example, the frequent 
                                                            
5 We begin with 2003, as the Thomson Reuter StreetEvents database’s coverage of conference calls prior to 2003 is 
incomplete. There are only 270 conference calls in 2001 and 1,379 conference calls in 2002 for S&P 500 firms in 
the database. For comparison, for the 2003-2012 period, the database contains between 1,900 to 1,950 conference 
calls for S&P 500 firms. 
6 These subjective labels have no bearing on the empirical analyses, because the analyses treat each topic as a 
distinct cluster of words regardless of the label. 
7 These two industries are among the five largest industries in our sample. Internet Appendix Table IA1 reports the 
keywords for the remaining three industries, including Energy, Software and Services, and Materials.  
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appearance of semantically related words “multiple,” “target-price,” “valuation,” “EPS,” and “price-to-
earnings” in a topic in the Capital Goods industry suggests that this topic is related to “valuation model.” 
Similarly, the frequent appearance of the words “drug,” “trial,” “announce,” “clinical,” and “phase,” in a 
topic in the Health Care Equipment & Services industry suggests that this topic relates to drug trials. We 
also find that LDA effectively uncovers general topics related to a firm’s financial performance, as well 
as industry-specific topics, such as offshore drilling in the energy industry, enterprise software and IT 
services in the software industry, and steel production in the materials industry (see Internet Appendix 
Table IA1). Finally, our results verify that the LDA algorithm recognizes the polysemy or contextual 
nature of words by assigning the same word to multiple topics. The word “price,” for example, is related 
to both “valuation” and “raw materials and input price” in the Capital Goods industry, reflecting the 
contextual nature of the word.  
In our second validation test, we compare the temporal variation in the amount of discussion 
dedicated to key topics with important industry and economy-wide events.8 Specifically, Figure 1 depicts 
the proportion of key topics in earnings conference calls and analyst reports for the banking and 
telecommunication industries from 2003 to 2012 and the performance of their respective sector indices 
(Financial Sector SPDR – XLF and iShares US Telecommunications – IYZ, respectively). We select 
these two industries based on the turmoil in the banking industry and the technology evolution in the 
telecommunication industry during our sample period.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Panel A of Figure 1 presents visual evidence of a reliable relation between the temporal variation in 
the distribution of key topics and economic performance in the banking industry. From 2003 to 2006, for 
example, management and analyst discussions are devoted primarily to the topics of “Growth” (mostly in 
loans and deposits) and “Mortgage Origination.” The discussion of these topics declines substantially in 
2007, however, with the advent of the financial crisis, while that of “Real Estate Loans” and 
                                                            
8 A similar validation technique is used in Quinn et al. (2010), who find that the proportion of key political topics in 
the Congressional Record tracks exogenous events, such as the September 11 attacks and the Iraq War. 
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“Deteriorating Performance and Losses” increases. Not surprisingly, after the approval of the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP) in October 2008, we see an increase in discussions of the topic “Equity 
Issuance and TARP.” Panel B of Figure 1 depicts the relation between technological developments and 
topic discussions for the telecommunications industry. Here, we see that landline-related topic discussions 
(e.g., DSL technology) decrease during our sample period, while topics labeled as “Smartphone 
Business” and “Wireless Subscribers” increase.  
In the third validation, we compare the LDA’s topic assignment to that of a human coder for a small 
sample of conference calls and the associated prompt analyst reports from Food, Beverage, and Tobacco 
industry. We first randomly select a conference call from each of the three companies in this industry 
(i.e., Campbell Soup, Coca-Cola, and Altria Group) and obtain the conference call transcripts and 
associated prompt analyst reports. Next, we invited an expert, who is an Institutional Investor All-Star 
analyst covering this industry, to label the intuition of the LDA-generated topics based on their 
keywords.9 Lastly, we provided the topic intuition generated by the All-Star analyst to a human coder (a 
graduate student in an accounting master degree program) and asked him to label the topics of each 
sentence in the call transcripts and analyst reports.10 The LDA topic assignment is consistent with manual 
assignment in 69%, 66%, and 60% of the sentences for Campbell Soup, Coca-Cola, and Altria Group, 
respectively. These consistency rates are much higher than 5%, which is the consistency rate between a 
random assignment of topics and manual coding.11   
Taken together, we interpret the evidence from the validation tests as supporting the effectiveness of 
LDA to identify and quantify economically meaningful topics in earnings conference calls and analyst 
reports.  
                                                            
9 The analyst considered the LDA topics “quite comprehensive and meaningful” and pointed out that “the key 
challenge (of topic classification) is a wide coverage of the topics and a flexibility of topics used in different 
situations.”  
10 The coder was given only the intuition of the 60 topics but not the keywords from the LDA outputs to avoid 
mimicking the LDA results. We asked the coder to assign each sentence to up to three topics due to the challenging 
nature of manual coding. 
11 If LDA randomly assigns one of the 60 topics to each sentence, the probability that this topic happens to be one of 
the three topics selected by the human coder is 3/60 = 5%. 
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3. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
The sample involved in the regression analyses is comprised of quarterly earnings conference call 
transcripts and analyst reports issued on the day of or the day following these conference calls for S&P 
500 firms from 2003 to 2012.12  
Table 2 describes our sample selection criteria. As shown in Panel A, we start from 18,607 earnings 
conference call transcripts available in the StreetEvents database. To verify that these are earnings 
conference calls, we match them with earnings announcement dates from I/B/E/S. This matching reduces 
our sample to 18,236 conference calls that occurred during days [0, +1] relative to the I/B/E/S earnings 
announcement dates. Next, we require each conference call to be accompanied by at least one analyst 
report, which yields a final sample of 17,750 earnings conference calls with matched analyst reports.13  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
As reported in Panel B of Table 2, the initial sample of analyst reports includes all reports issued for 
S&P 500 firms during the 2003-2012 period (476,633 reports) that we use to perform our LDA analysis. 
We then exclude reports not issued on the day of or the day following an earnings conference call. We 
also exclude reports issued on the day of a call but prior to its start time. Our final sample is comprised of 
159,210 analyst reports. Prompt analyst reports constitute 33% of the entire population of analyst reports 
(or 46.5% if we only consider revision reports), an overwhelming percentage considering that they are 
concentrated in only eight days of a year. These statistics reinforce the importance of understanding the 
analyst information intermediary roles immediately following corporate disclosure events.  
Over the entire sample period, an average of nine analyst reports are issued in the two-day window 
after the calls. Since our focus is on the information role of analysts in aggregate, we combine all analyst 
reports issued during this two-day window and denote it as . To examine the difference between the 
                                                            
12 Our sample firms constitute, on average, about 72% of the total U.S. market capitalization, or 77% of the total 
U.S. firms covered by analysts. We acknowledge that our findings based on S&P 500 firms might not directly apply 
to smaller firms that receive less analyst coverage. 
13 Thomson Reuters Streetevent Database provides tickers of firms hosting the conference calls. We manually match 
the conference calls to Compustat’s S&P 500 list using these tickers. For analyst reports, we extract firms’ tickers 
from analyst reports and match the reports to Compustat’s S&P 500 list using tickers.  
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respective topic proportions in the analyst and manager narratives, we conduct a Pearson’s chi-square test 
for the homogeneity of the distribution of topics discussed in each  and  pair (see Internet Appendix 
Table IA2).14 The homogeneity between the topic distributions in these documents is rejected at the 10% 
level for 91% of conference calls. That is, in 91% of the -  pairs, managers and analysts devote 
different proportions of narratives to each topic. In contrast, the topic distributions of analyst questions 
( ) and manager answers ( ) in the Q&A session are significantly different at the 10% level for 
only 0.17% of the conference calls. This finding is consistent with intuition and provides further 
validation for LDA topic measures. Finally, to reduce noise, we include in the empirical analyses topics if 
their length exceeds 2% of the document’s entire length.15 On average,  ( ) in our sample contain 14 
(12) such topics; furthermore, the combined length of these topics accounts for over 80% (85%) of the 
entire discussion in the  ( ). 
4. Empirical measures, tests and results 
The evidence in Section 3 suggests that topic distributions in  and  are different. Based on this 
evidence, we operationalize the analyst information discovery role as cases when analysts discuss topics 
that receive little or no mention by managers during the  and their information interpretation role as 
cases when they discuss  topics in their prompt reports. Internet Appendix II provides two illustrative 
examples for each role using excerpts from conference call transcripts and analyst reports. In our sample, 
analysts spend an average of 31% (69%) of their discussion on discovery (interpretation). The value of 
analysts’ discovery and interpretation roles, however, depends on whether analyst efforts, combined with 
their high level of financial expertise and in-depth knowledge of the firm and industry, result in valuable 
information beyond the conference calls. The following empirical analyses investigate whether and under 
what circumstances analyst information discovery and interpretation provide value to investors.  
                                                            
14 The topic distribution of a document can be expressed as a topic vector, in which element  is the percentage of 
the sentences dedicated to the discussion of topic . Pearson’s chi-square test tests the null that the topic vector of 
 equals the topic vector of .  
15 As a robustness check, we rerun our empirical tests with topics defined as those receiving no less than 1% or 3% 
of the discussion, or as the top ten topics based on the proportion of discussion, and find similar results.  
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4.1. Do investors value analyst information discovery and interpretation roles? 
We assess the value analyst information discovery and interpretation provided to investors by 
estimating the following regression:   
0,1 _ _ _ ,  (1) 
where the market reaction, 0,1 , is the cumulative market-adjusted return during [0, 1] relative to the 
earnings announcement dates.16 Because the market return is directional, we follow Huang et al. (2014) 
and Davis et al. (2015) and use the tone of the narratives (i.e., the percentage of positive sentences less the 
percentage of negative sentences) contained in  and  to explain .17 _  is the 
favorableness of analyst opinions contained in the new topics discussed in analyst reports, whereas 
_  is the favorableness of analyst opinions contained in the topics that appear in  and are 
discussed in analyst reports. Because previous research indicates that managers’ tone is sticky (e.g., Davis 
et al. 2015), _  is measured by subtracting the tone of the company’s previous earnings conference 
call from the tone of the current one. Our control variables are: earnings surprises ( _ ), a dummy 
variable indicating whether a firm’s earnings miss the most recent analyst consensus forecast ( ), and 
their interaction term ( _ ∗ ) to capture the nonlinear relation between earnings surprise and 
market returns; recent news is captured by the abnormal returns during the ten trading days prior to the 
report date ( _ ); firm characteristics that impact its information environment (Lang and 
Lundholm 1993), including firm size ( ), book-to-market ratio ( ), and number of analyst reports 
being considered (# ); and year fixed-effects.18 Detailed variable definitions are in Appendix III. 
Standard errors are estimated with a two-way cluster at the firm and year levels.  
[Insert Tables 3 and 4 here] 
                                                            
16 This return window encompasses the earnings announcements, conference calls, and analyst reports in our 
sample. We obtain similar results using return windows of [-1, 1] and [-1, 2] relative to the earnings announcement 
dates.  
17 We follow the procedures described in Huang et al. (2014) to classify each sentence as positive, negative, or 
neutral with the naïve Bayes algorithm. 
18 In a sensitivity test reported in Internet Appendix Table IA3, we also include other research outputs contained in 
the analyst reports as control variables, including the revisions of earnings forecasts, stock recommendations, and 
target prices. The estimated coefficients on _  and _  remain significant and positive.  
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The summary statistics reported in Table 3 show that both mean values of _  and 
_  are positive (0.188 and 0.217, respectively), consistent with the overall analyst 
optimism documented in the literature. The average tone of earnings conference calls is 0.276, which is 
significantly more positive than analysts’ tone, suggesting that managers in general are more optimistic 
than analysts.  
The results of estimating Eq. (1) are reported in Table 4. We find positive and significant (at the 0.01 
level) coefficients on both _  and _ , after controlling for managers’ 
disclosure, earnings surprises, and other variables that can explain market reactions, consistent with both 
roles providing incremental value to the market. A one standard deviation increase in _  
increases the two-day market adjusted return by 1.09%; a one standard deviation increase in 
_  increases it by 0.65%, indicating that both roles trigger economically significant market 
reactions. F-tests show that the coefficient on _  is significantly greater than that of 
_ . Overall, results in Table 4 suggest that investors value both analyst information 
discovery and interpretation roles and place a greater weight on their interpretation role immediately after 
earnings conference calls. 19, 20 
  
                                                            
19 The estimated coefficients on _  and _ ∗  imply an earnings response coefficient (ERC) of 
2.828 (0.325) for firms beating (missing) analyst forecasts. These values are consistent with prior literature (e.g., 
Lopez and Rees 2002), but are likely too low to be considered as a reasonable price-to-earnings ratio for our sample. 
This may be due to the fact that unexpected earnings do not have the same degree of permanence as current earnings 
(Ohlson 1991) or because of non-linearities in the return-earnings relation (Freeman and Tse, 1992). To examine the 
impact of non-linearities in the return-earnings relation on ERC, we regress the market reaction on the earnings 
surprise in four different regions: large positive ( _  is larger than 0.005), small positive ( _  is 
between 0 and 0.005), small negative ( _  is between -0.005 and 0), and large negative ( _  is smaller 
than -0.005). In untabulated results, we find that the ERCs of the aforementioned four groups are 3.070, 9.410, 
7.650, and 1.041 respectively, in line with results in prior studies (see, Freeman and Tse 1992). We note that the 
ERCs for small positive and small negative surprises are significantly higher than the ones reported in Table 4. 
Finally, including the interactions of _  with these four indicator variables in all of our regressions of 
market reactions (i.e., Tables 4, 5, 7 and 8) yields similar results. 
20 To examine whether market reaction to analyst information roles depends on the consistency in _  
and _ , we include in regression model (1) the interaction terms of _ ∗ _ _  and 
_ ∗ _ _ , where _ _  is the absolute difference between _  and 
_ . The results, tabulated in Internet Appendix Table IA4, show significant (at the 0.01 level) and 
negative coefficients on _ ∗ _ _ , consistent with the intuition that analysts’ discovery 
becomes more useful when its tone is more consistent with the tone of analyst interpretation. 
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4.2. What determines investors’ value of analyst information discovery and interpretation?  
To understand the economic determinants of the value of analyst information discovery and 
interpretation, we estimate the following regression:  





In Eq. (2), coefficient estimates on the interaction terms demonstrate whether discovery or 
interpretation triggers additional market reaction under various economic conditions. We conjecture that 
investors would place a greater value on the analyst information discovery role when managers withhold 
value-relevant information from investors. Prior literature on voluntary disclosure identifies several 
situations in which managers are more likely to withhold information, including firms with high 
proprietary costs, high litigation risk, and bad news, all of which we examine in Eq. (2). For the analyst 
information interpretation role, we posit that investors would place a greater value on this role when the 
processing cost of conference call information is higher. Next, we discuss our measures of proprietary 
cost, litigation risk, bad news, and processing cost. 
Proprietary cost 
Managers may choose to withhold proprietary information if disclosing it hurts firms’ competitive 
advantage. Numerous studies on the proprietary cost of disclosure find that such costs represent a 
significant consequence that prevents managers from being forthcoming (see reviews in Verrecchia 2001; 
Dye 2001; Healy and Palepu 2001). Managers, for example, may withhold information on research and 
development related to an innovative product or a new drug. In this case, analysts may exert more efforts 
in private research, such as communicating with the company’s employees, researching the company’s 
patent filing, investigating the company’s suppliers, and attending company-hosted or industry 
conferences to collect value-relevant information that they can provide to investors. We follow Li et al. 
(2013) and measure the proprietary cost of disclosure (denoted as ) as the percentage of 
competition references (i.e., occurrence of words related to competition) in the firm’s previous conference 
15 
 
call.21 Li et al. (2013) argue that this measure reflects managers’ perceptions of competition and thus does 
not rely on industry boundaries or comprehensive identification of all sources of competition (e.g., 
competition from private firms, foreign firms, and potential new entrants).  
Litigation risk 
Another factor that previous research identifies as affecting disclosure is the litigation risk faced by a 
firm (Healy and Palepu 2001; Johnson et al. 2001). Rogers and Van Buskirk (2009), for example, find 
that, despite the protection of the Safe Harbor provision of the 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act, firms that have been subjects of disclosure-related shareholder lawsuits are more wary about 
providing information to investors. Consistent with the results in these studies, Hollander et al. (2010) 
find that managers are less likely to answer participant questions during earnings conference calls when 
litigation risk is high. We follow Hollander et al. (2010) and Field et al. (2005) and measure litigation risk 
using the standard deviation of monthly returns over the one year prior to the conference call (denoted as 
).  
Bad news  
Theoretical models generally predict that disclosure increases with firm performance (e.g., Dye 1986; 
Verrecchia 1983). When a manager has bad news to deliver, he may choose to withhold relevant 
information, such as the true explanations for the bad performance, because such information may 
decrease his human capital and reputation (Verrecchia 2001). Empirical studies generally support this 
theory (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993; Miller 2002; Chen et al. 2011). It is also possible that when there 
is bad news, managers are forced to focus on past performance and cannot disclose other relevant 
information. This is suggested in the survey evidence in Graham et al. (2005) that “if the company fails to 
                                                            
21 Following Li et al. (2013), we consider a number of competition references: “competition,” “competitor,” 
“competitive,” “compete,” and “competing.” We include words with an “s” appended and remove phrases that 
contain negation, such as “less competitive,” and “few competitors.” We also scale the number of counts by the total 
number of words in the document. Although Li et al. (2013) construct their measure using the MD&A section of 10-
K filings, we capture managers’ perceptions of competition from . We examine 100 randomly selected 
competition references from our sample and find that they highly resemble the examples provided in Appendix A of 
Li et al. (2013). We use the competition measure based on the firm’s previous earnings conference call to mitigate 
endogeneity concern.  
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meet the guided number…the focus shifts to talking about why the company was unable to meet the 
consensus estimate” as opposed to talking about the firm’s future prospects. For these reasons, we expect 
investors to place a greater value on the analyst information discovery role when firms deliver bad news 
during their conference calls. We measure firm news using two variables: an indicator variable of whether 
a firm’s earnings have missed the analyst consensus forecast (denoted as ) and the earnings surprise 
(denoted as _ ). 
Processing cost 
Previous research shows that earnings conference calls may entail high information processing costs 
if managers’ statements are unstructured, ambiguous, subjective, or qualitative (Frankel et al. 1999; 
Brochet et al. 2016). Prior research also documents that the demand for analyst research increases when 
investors’ understanding of corporate disclosures requires high processing costs (Lehavy et al. 2011). 
Accordingly, we expect that investors find the analyst information interpretation role more valuable when 
the information disclosed during the conference call is more difficult to process.  
We use five measures to evaluate the processing cost of conference call information. The first two 
are based on the notion that ambiguous language imposes higher processing costs (Epstein and Schneider 
2008). Ambiguous language normally contains uncertain words and qualitative and subjective statements. 
We follow Loughran and McDonald (2013) and measure the percentage of uncertain words contained in a 
 (denoted as ).22 Specifically, when managers use words such as “may,” “assume,” 
“possibly,” and “approximately,” it is more difficult for investors to judge the quality of the information. 
Consistent with this argument, Loughran and McDonald find that having a greater number of uncertain 
words in Form S-1 filings increases the volatility in the valuation of the IPO. Compared to quantitative 
information, qualitative and subjective language is harder to process because of the lack of precision, 
reliability, and objective benchmarks (Huang et al. 2014). We follow Huang et al. (2014) and measure the 
extent to which qualitative vocabulary is used to discuss firm performance in the  (denoted as 
                                                            
22 The complete list of uncertain words is available at http://www3.nd.edu/~mcdonald/Word_Lists.html. 
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) as one minus the percentage of sentences that contain “$” or “%.” The third measure is 
based on the intuition that the complexity of the disclosure might increase with the complexity of firms’ 
operations. Following Frankel et al. (2006), we measure the complexity of firm operations using the 
number of firm segments (# ). The last two measures concern firm performance. Hutton et al. 
(2003), among others, argue that investors are naturally skeptical about good news from managers, 
because managers benefit from good news but have no incentives to exaggerate bad news. Hutton et al. 
(2003) show that bad news from managers is always informative regardless of the inclusion of 
supplementary statements, but good news from managers is informative only when accompanied by 
supplementary statements. Their finding suggests that compared to the situation of bad news, investors 
rely more on analysts’ interpretation of good news from managers, because the information is more 
ambiguous and less credible. We use  and _  to measure firm performance.  
Analyst characteristics 
We consider whether analyst forecast experience ( ) and their All-Star status ( ) influence 
the value of their information discovery and interpretation roles.  is the average forecasting 
experience, in terms of the number of years appearing in I/B/E/S, of analysts issuing reports immediately 
after the conference call;  is the percentage of Institutional Investor All-Stars among the analysts 
issuing prompt reports. Prior research yields mixed results regarding the relation between star status and 
forecast accuracy (Stickel 1992; Emery and Li 2009), and between experience and forecast performance 
(Mikhail et al. 1997; Clement 1999); and Huang et al. 2014 find no association between star status and 
market’s reaction to the textual opinion of analysts. Accordingly, we do not have an a priori belief as to 
how these characteristics may affect the value of either role. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 3 show that the mean of  is 0.071 words per one 
hundred words in a  (or four competition-related words per ), comparable to the sample mean of 
0.058 in Li et al. (2013). The mean value of  indicates that 22.2% of our sample conference calls 
contain earnings that have missed the consensus forecast. The mean value for  is 0.836 words 
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per one hundred words in the , which corresponds to an average of around 72 uncertain words in a . 
As a benchmark, the mean value for  reported in Loughran and McDonald (2013) for their 
sample of S-1 filings is 1.41 words per one hundred words. Our mean value for  indicates 
that, on average, 80.7% of the sentences in our  are qualitative. The median number of business 
segments for our sample firms (# ) is two (the natural log of which is 0.693). The mean 
forecasting experience of our sample analysts is eight years, and average percentage of stars in them is 
22.4%.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The results of estimating Eq. (2) are reported in Table 5, Panel A. We find that the coefficients on the 
interaction terms _ ∗ , _ ∗  and 
_ ∗  are positive and significant (at least at the 10% level), supporting our prediction 
that investors place a greater value on the analyst information discovery role when managers have greater 
incentives to withhold relevant information during conference calls – that is, when firms face higher 
proprietary cost or litigation risk, or deliver bad news in the earnings conference calls. Moreover, 
consistent with our prediction that investors put a greater value on the analyst information interpretation 
role when the processing cost of the disclosure is higher, we find that the coefficients on the interaction 
terms _ ∗  and _ ∗  are positive and significant (at 
the 5% level) and that the coefficient on _ ∗  is negative and significant (at the 5% 
level). That is, the analyst information interpretation role provides more value when managers’ statements 
are more uncertain and qualitative, and less value when managers deliver bad news in the conference call. 
The coefficient on the interaction term between _  and # , however, is 
insignificant, probably because the number of segments is a noisy measure of operations complexity for 
S&P 500 firms (more than half of sample firms have either one or two segments). The coefficient 
estimates on the interaction terms between tones and _  are insignificant, suggesting that the 
impact of earnings performance on analyst value is non-linear and driven by the occurrence of bad news. 
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We find negative (positive) and significant coefficients on the interaction term between 
_  ( _ ) and , suggesting that less experienced analysts trigger greater 
market reaction with discovery, while more experienced analysts trigger greater market reaction with 
interpretation. This result is consistent with the finding in Soltes (2014) that less experienced analysts 
have more private interaction with management, which is an important source of analyst discovery. Soltes 
(2014) argues that less experienced analysts are not as familiar with the economics and institutional 
features of the industries and firms they cover (consistent with their interpretation being less informative), 
and thus they compensate for this deficiency in experience by creating opportunities to gain additional 
information about the firms through private interaction with managers. Consistent with the mixed 
evidence in the literature, we do not find that investors react to  analysts’ discovery or interpretation 
roles differently. 
In Panel B of Table 5, we estimate the regression model of Eq. (1) for subsamples where managers’ 
incentive to withhold information or the processing cost of the conference calls is particularly high or 
low. We examine investors’ relative value of each role in these subsamples by comparing the magnitude 
of the estimated coefficients on	 _  and _ . The F-test results are reported in 
Panel B of Table 5. In the subsample with  in the top (bottom) decile, the coefficient of 
_  is not statistically different from (significantly smaller than) that of _ ; a 
similar pattern is observed in the subsample with  in the top and bottom deciles. The F-tests 
show a statistically greater coefficient on _ 	than that on _  in the 
subsamples with  in both the top and bottom deciles, and in the subsample with  
in the top decile. The coefficients on _  and _  are not statistically different 
from each other for the subsample with  in the bottom decile. Combined, these statistics 
suggest that investors put a greater value on the analyst information interpretation role immediately 
following earnings conference calls when managers’ incentive to withhold information is low, and when 
processing cost is high. The value of analyst discovery becomes as important as that of analyst 
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interpretation when managers’ have strong incentives to withhold information or when the amount of 
qualitative statements in  is very low. 
4.3. Analysts’ response to investors’ information demands 
To further investigate the interplay between the information in analyst research reports and the 
closely preceding corporate disclosure, we examine the relation between analyst efforts in each 
information role and the economic determinants identified in the previous section. We measure the effort 
spent on the information discovery role as the proportion of discussion in analyst research reports devoted 
to topics that receive little or no mention by managers in the  (denoted as ). Because 
investors value analyst information discovery more when managers are more likely to withhold 
information, that is, when firms face higher proprietary cost, higher litigation risk, or deliver bad news in 
the conference call, we predict that  increases with these economic determinants.   
Because investors value analyst information interpretation more when conference calls contain a 
greater amount of uncertain and qualitative/subjective language, we posit that in these situations, analysts 
expend more effort to clarify managers’ statements. That is, analysts likely transform management’s 
original statements from the  into a more meaningful narrative, which should manifest itself as 
different word usage from that of managers ( ). To measure this construct, we calculate the 
average difference between the word vectors of  and  for the  topics that are also discussed in 
analyst reports (i.e., the average of one minus the cosine similarity between these vectors).23  
As additional control variables, we include the number of analyst questions during the Q&A session 
(# , measured as the natural log of one plus the number of questions raised by analysts in the 
Q&A session). Because analysts likely request managers to clarify some statements during the Q&A 
                                                            
23 Word vector of topic k in a document, , , …  contains the frequency of all N word in the discussion of 
topic  in the document (  is the total number of unique words in the corpus). Cosine similarity is computed as the 
dot product of the two vectors normalized by their vector length and captures the textual similarity between two 
vectors of an inner product space using the cosine angle between them. Two vectors with the same orientation (i.e., 
two exact same or proportional topic vectors) have a cosine similarity of one; two orthogonal vectors have a 
similarity of zero. Cosine similarity is widely used in textual analysis research to compare narratives (see the review 
of Loughran and McDonald 2016). Internet Appendix II provides two illustrative examples from excerpts of 
conference calls transcripts and analyst reports, with high and low levels of , respectively. 
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session, analysts’ questions might reduce the need for further clarification in prompt reports. In addition, 
we control for the magnitude of the earnings news using the absolute value of the earnings surprise 
( _ _ ). Finally, we control for the length of the combined prompt analyst reports 
( _ ), because Brown and Tucker (2011) find that measures based on cosine similarity are 
positively correlated with document length.  
Descriptive statistics of the variables included in this test are reported in Table 3. The average 
 level of 0.54 is consistent with the existence of analysts’ interpretation using their own 
language (this variable is bounded within [0, 1]). In our sample, analysts ask 26 questions, on average, 
during the Q&A session of the call (mean value of #  is 3). The mean (median) length of the 
combined prompt analyst reports ( _ ) is 360 (320) sentences, reflected across an average of nine 
reports (# ).  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Table 6 reports the regression results for the cross-sectional determinants of analyst efforts. The 
dependent variables in columns (1) and (2) are  and , respectively. The 
positive and significant (at least at the 5% level) coefficients on the proprietary cost measure 
( ), litigation risk ( ), and bad performance ( ) (reported in column 1) are 
consistent with our prediction that analysts increase their efforts in information discovery when managers 
have greater incentives to withhold relevant information during conference calls. Column (2) of Table 6 
shows that  and  are positive and significant at the 1% level, which also supports 
our prediction that analysts increase their interpretation efforts when the conference call is more difficult 
to process. 24 One interesting finding of note is that in column (2), the results in the regression of 
                                                            
24 An alternative explanation of this result is that the processing cost of  reflects a difficult-to-understand 
business environment, and such an environment naturally demands a larger vocabulary to describe, which results 
in dissimilar language among any information preparers who attempt to describe it. To investigate the validity of 
this explanation, we conduct a placebo test related to language differences among analysts. In this test, we 
randomly divided  into two groups and re-run the  regression by replacing its dependent 
variable to the language difference between the two groups of analyst reports. The results are reported in Internet 
Appendix Table IA5. This table shows that the higher processing costs of  do not explain the language 
differences among analysts, which is inconsistent with the alternative explanation.  
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 yield a significantly negative coefficient for # , suggesting that analysts 
embark on their information roles during the Q&A session of the earnings conference calls by asking 
questions; this involvement, in turn, preempts some efforts on the interpretation they exhibit in their 
prompt reports. It is also consistent with evidence shown by Matsumoto et al. (2011) that the information 
content of earnings conference calls increases with analyst involvement. Finally, the coefficients on  
and  are insignificant except for the one on  in the  regression. This is probably 
because the effort allocation between discovery and interpretation is mostly driven by investors’ 
information demand and less by analyst traits. That is, a star analyst can provide more discovery for one 
firm but more interpretation for another, depending on the firm’s characteristics or the corporate 
disclosure.25 
Overall, the findings in Table 6 indicate that analysts’ efforts spent on information discovery and 
interpretation reflect their prompt responses to information demands from investors, which ultimately are 
driven by the characteristics of the firms and managerial disclosures.  
4.4. Do investors value analysts’ efforts? 
Having established that investors respond to analysts’ information interpretation and discovery and 
that analysts, in turn, respond to the demands for this information, we next examine the effect of analyst 
efforts on the value of the different types of discussions in  and  using the following model: 
0,1 _ _ ∗
_ _ ∗ 1
_ ∗ 1 ∗ _
_ ∗
∗ _ ∗ . 
(3) 
 
Eq. (3) expands the regression model of Eq. (1) by including the interaction terms between the tone 
of the discussion and the measures of analysts’ efforts (i.e., the proportion of discovery and interpretation 
in ,  and 1 , respectively, and the extent of new language used by analysts 
to interpret the  topics, ). If investors value analyst efforts spent on each role, we 
                                                            
25 We repeat the analysis in Table 6 at the individual analyst report level and tabulate the results in Internet 
Appendix Table IA6. At the analyst level, analyst experience and star status are statistically insignificant. 
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expect the coefficients on these interaction terms to have positive signs. We also include the interaction 
term, _ ∗ , to examine whether the manner of analysts’ interpretation affects the 
market reaction to managers’ discussion. We do not provide a predicted sign for the interaction term, 
because the extent of using dissimilar language by analysts can have opposing effects on how the market 
reacts to managers’ disclosures: On the one hand, when analysts use the same or similar language as 
managers, they provide a confirming value by enhancing management statements’ trustworthiness (i.e., 
the market reacts more to management disclosures when analysts use a more similar language), which 
suggests a negative predicted sign; on the other hand, analyst new language provides clarification and 
helps investors understand managers’ discussions (i.e., the market reacts more to management disclosures 
when analysts use a more different language), which suggests a positive predicted sign. Finally, we 
include the interaction terms ∗  and _ ∗  to examine 
whether the market reacts to earnings news more intensely because analysts adopt new language to 
interpret corporate disclosure.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The results of estimating Eq. (3) are reported in Table 7. We find that value of each role increases 
with its proportion of the analyst report, as evidenced by the positive and significant (at the 1% level) 
coefficients on _ ∗  and _ ∗ 1 . We also find 
that the coefficient on _ 	 ∗ 1 ∗  is positive and significant, 
indicating that investors additionally value analysts’ interpretation, given its length when analysts use 
more of their own language to discuss the  topics. The estimated coefficient on _ ∗
 is significant and positive, suggesting that, on average, the clarification effect of 
analysts’ interpretation on managerial disclosure dominates its confirming effect. We do not find, 
however, that market reaction to earnings news intensifies with the level of , probably 
because analysts use new language to clarify the qualitative information released by managers but not the 
quantitative signals, such as earnings surprises. Overall, the evidence in Table 7 indicates that investors 
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value analysts’ efforts expended on their information discovery and interpretation roles and that the 
market finds managers’ disclosures more informative when analysts spend more efforts to clarify these 
disclosures.  
4.5. Does analyst confirmation provide value to investors?  
Prior studies on media (e.g., Miller 2006; Drake et al. 2014) distinguish the media’s role of creating 
new information from its role of disseminating information.26 In this section, we investigate the 
possibility that analyst research reports provide value to investors without discovering new information or 
interpreting corporate disclosure using new languages.  
To do so, we design a test that identifies the parts of the discussion in analyst reports that simply 
provide confirmation to managers’ discussions. Empirically, we employ the Pearson’s chi-square test for 
each  topic in each -  pair to test whether the words used by managers and analysts to discuss a 
given topic are statistically different. We classify the analyst interpretation of a  topic as using similar 
language when the difference in the distribution of words used to discuss this topic by analysts and 
managers is not statistically significant.27 Defined in this way, we find that the interpretation using similar 
language constitutes 23% of a prompt report, on average, whereas interpretation using new language 
constitutes 46% (the remaining 31% is in discovery).  
We employ the following regression model to investigate whether investors consider all three types 
of information valuable:  




[Insert Table 8 here] 
The results of estimating the above regression are reported in Table 8. We find positive and 
significant coefficients for all tone variables, i.e., _ , _ , and 
                                                            
26 In a similar vein, Clement et al. (2003) show that management earnings forecasts that confirm market expectation 
provide value to investors and reduce the uncertainty about future earnings. 
27 That is, if the Pearson’s chi-square test fails to reject the homogeneity between  and  with respect to their 
word distributions in this topic at the 10% level. 
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_ , consistent with the usefulness of all types of analyst discussions. As one might 
expect, the magnitude of the positive and significant (at the 1% level) coefficient on 
_  is significantly smaller than that of _  and 
_  (both F-tests significant at the 1% levels). More importantly, the positive and 
significant coefficient on _  indicates the confirming value provided by analysts. 
That is, by selectively repeating  topics, analysts attract and direct investors’ limited attention to what 
is important from managers – confirming these topics’ usefulness. Moreover, repeating  topics likely 
enhances the reliability of the statements of managers, who may suffer from agency problems, thus 
confirming these statements’ validity.28   
5. Conclusion 
An overwhelming proportion of analyst reports are issued immediately following important corporate 
disclosure events. Despite the vast literature on analysts, we know surprisingly little about how analysts 
serve the information intermediary roles in this narrow window. We fill the gap in the literature by 
examining the information content of analyst textual reports, in comparison to information in the 
preceding corporate disclosure, and whether their efforts, as well as their value, are driven by the 
characteristics of corporate disclosures.  
We use algorithmic analyses of the topics discussed in the textual data of the conference calls and 
analyst reports to develop novel measures of analysts’ information roles. We find that, on average, 31% 
of an analyst prompt report discusses exclusive topics not referred to in the conference call, which we 
consider as analysts serving an information discovery role. In the remaining 69% of the discussion in a 
prompt report, analysts discuss conference call topics, which we consider as the information interpretation 
role. We show that both discovery and interpretation trigger economically significant market reactions 
                                                            
28 Consistent with this intuition, when asked whether analysts sometimes simply confirm what managers say, the 
All-Star analyst we interviewed replied: “My experience is that sometimes analysts selectively pick up managers’ 
comments to repeat. In many cases it is because he/she believes certain topics are more interesting to the market or 
have meaningful impact on earnings. In the extreme case of ‘parroting’, analysts use it to show investors that their 
thinking is in line with management.” 
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beyond the associated earnings news and conference call discussions, suggesting that analyst information 
roles provide value. To understand the sources of their value, we show that investors rely on analyst 
information discovery more when managers have stronger incentives to withhold information during the 
conference calls and rely on analyst information interpretation more when the processing cost of the 
conference call information is higher. Analyst effort to discuss new topics and their effort to use their own 
language to clarify managers’ statements suggest they offer prompt responses to investors’ information 
demands. Finally, we show that within the 69% of the discussion in prompt reports where analysts 
interpret conference call topics, 23% of such discussion does not entail a different vocabulary than that 
used by managers in the conference call. That is, analysts sometimes confirm managers’ statements. 
Interestingly, we find that investors value such confirmation, albeit to a lesser extent than analyst 
discovery or interpretation using the analyst’s own language. This finding is consistent with analysts 
providing confirming value to the topics’ relevance and validity by selectively repeating management 
statements.  
Our study advances the literature by contributing to the understanding of the different information 
roles that analysts play, as well as the interplay between their information roles and corporate disclosures. 
We also make a contribution by explicitly quantifying the thematic content of analyst research reports and 
contrasting it with managers’ discussions during earnings conference calls.  Our study provides insight 
into how to use topic modeling to significantly expand the application of textual analysis to incorporate 
financial disclosures beyond an understanding of “how texts are being said” to a broader understanding of 
“what is being said” in these texts.  
Finally, topic modeling has the potential to be used in a variety of research settings as a way to reduce 
large amounts of textual data into a manageable and conceptually interpretable set of topics. These topics 
can be used to address a variety of questions, including the cross-sectional and temporal variation in topic 
discussions in regulatory filings (e.g., Dyer et al. 2016), the characteristics (e.g., breadth) of firm 
disclosure on social media or in management guidance, the information content of corporate filings issued 
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by firms relative to that of reports issued by information intermediaries (e.g., analysts, credit rating 
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Intuition of Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) 
LDA assumes that a document is generated in two steps. First, a topic is randomly drawn based on the 
topic distribution of this document; next, a word is randomly drawn based on the word distribution of the 
topic selected in the previous step. Repeating these two steps word by word generates a complete 
document. This basic idea of LDA simulates how a human writes a document: He/she has a plan to 
discuss certain topics first and then selects words to explain each topic.  
Appendix Figure 1 illustrates a hypothetical example of this two-step document generation process. First, 
we assume that a collection of documents discusses ten different topics in total, including topics of retail 
stores, business outlook, inventory, etc. Each document in this collection discusses some of the ten topics. 
Put in statistical language, each document in this collection relates to the ten topics probabilistically: 
High-probability topics are discussed more heavily in the document than low-probability topics, and a 
zero-probability topic is one that is not discussed in the document at all. Next, each topic is related to 
words probabilistically. High-probability words in a topic mean that they are more likely to appear in this 
topic. For example, the four words with the highest probabilities in Topic 1 (Stores) are: “new,” “store,” 
“open,” and “square.” Note that a word can have high probabilities in more than one topic. The word 
“new,” for example, has high probabilities in Topic 1 (Stores), Topic 5 (Management), and Topic 7 
(Growth and Expansion), because this word is used frequently in all three topics. Some words can relate 
to a topic with zero probability if they never appear in that topic.  
To compare the topics of analyst reports and conference calls, we want to find the topic distribution of 
each document and the word distribution of each topic. The LDA algorithm achieves this by fitting a 
generative model to the actual words in documents and finding the best set of latent variables that 
describe the two sets of distributions. This is similar to how a maximum likelihood estimation method 
maximizes the “agreement” of the model with the observed data. Technical details of LDA are discussed 




























Appendix Figure 1. An illustration of how LDA assumes a document is generated 



















Hypothetical topic distribution for the example document 
              1       2        3        4         5       6        7       8        9     10    Topic index 










“We have one more store(1) in the fall(8) here in Dallas(1). As mentioned earlier, we touch over 100 stores(1) a year in terms of renovation(1) 
and we have some of our new(5) growth(7) concepts(1) that will be opening(1). So I think the commercial(2) real(1) estate(1) market(6) going 
forward is still fairly uncertain(6). We have a lot of opportunities(7) in our existing(1) stores(1) for increased productivity(5) and we will continue 
to invest(7) in new(1) attractions(2) and new(7) ways to improve(5) our performance(10) in our existing(1) stores(1). And then the last question 
on inventory(3), the spread(10) improved at the end of fourth quarter(9) versus third quarter(9), but we are still seeing inventory(3) outpace 
sales(10) on a per square(1) foot(1) basis. “ 
A hypothetical document generated by sampling topics and sampling words 
1 
Hypothetical word distributions for each topic 

















Step 1: Randomly draw a topic from the topic 
distribution for the document. 
Step 2: Randomly draw 
a word from the word 






















Step 2: Randomly draw 
a word from the word 
distribution of topic 8. 
Step 2: Randomly draw 
a word from the word 
distribution of topic 1. 
Step 2: Randomly draw 
a word from the word 




Applying LDA to Conference Call Transcripts and Analyst Reports 
A. The corpus 
Earnings conference call transcripts are obtained from Thomson Reuter’s StreetEvents database, and 
analyst reports are obtained from Thomson Reuter’s Investext database. Our corpus is composed of 
18,607 earnings conference call transcripts and 476,633 analyst reports for S&P 500 firms from 2003 to 
2012, all of which are used in the LDA to obtain the best representation of topics. We conduct the LDA 
analyses separately for each industry, because many topics are industry-specific. We use four-digit 
Standard & Poor’s Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) to identify industries. This 
classification is widely adopted by brokerages and analysts as their industry classification system and is 
superior to other industry classification schemes, such as SIC codes and NAICS codes, in identifying 
firms with their industry peers (Kadan et al. 2012; Boni and Womack 2006; Bhojraj et al. 2003).  
B. Preprocessing of textual documents 
The raw files of conference call transcripts that we obtained from Thomson Reuter’s StreetEvents 
database are in XML (i.e., extensible markup language) format. We develop a Java program to parse the 
XML files and extract useful information, including company names, tickers, dates and times of the calls, 
participants and their titles, and textual dialogues. The downloaded analyst reports are in PDF (i.e., 
portable document format) format. We first use Adobe Acrobat to convert them into TXT (i.e., text file) 
format and then develop a Java program to extract the report issuance dates, analyst names, broker names, 
and the reports’ textual content. 
The next several steps prepare the textual data for the LDA analysis. First, we exclude venue-specific 
language or time-invariant information that is not associated with any economically relevant topics. For 
conference calls, we exclude narratives from operators, greeting words used by various speakers, and the 
safe harbor statements typically read by Investor Relation Officers. For analyst reports, we follow Huang 
et al. (2014) and remove the tables, graphs, and “brokerage disclosures.” Brokerage disclosures contain 
explanations of the stock-rating system, disclosures regarding conflicts of interest, analyst certifications, 
disclaimers, glossaries, and descriptions of the brokerage firm. Second, we convert all words into lower 
case, remove all non-English characters (e.g., punctuation and numbers), and convert all plural nouns into 
their singular forms.29  
Third, we remove high frequency functional words, also referred to as stop words. There are two benefits 
from removing stop words. First, these words, such as “a,” “of,” “the,” “this,” and “is,” are extremely 
frequent, but convey little economic meaning. Second, stop words contain many deictic words (that is, 
words that cannot be fully understood without additional contextual information) that constitute the major 
difference between oral language and written language.30 Removing them helps mitigate the concern that 
the difference between conference calls and analyst reports are due to the difference in language style. 
Fourth, we follow Heylighen and Dewaele (2002) and delete more contextual words that distinguish oral 
language from written language. Heylighen and Dewaele (2002) develop a much simpler but coarser way 
                                                            
29 We do not perform “stemming” (i.e., replacing words with their root form), because it is too aggressive for 
financial text, where words with the same stem are often not synonyms. For example, standard stemming would 
convert “marketing” into “market,” “accounting” into “account,” “investment” into “invest,” and both “operating” 
and “operation” into “oper” (Porter 1980).  
30 Oral language is more context dependent than written language (Heylighen and Dewaele 2002; Levelt 1989; Lee 
2016). Levelt (1989), for example, distinguishes four types of deixis: person (e.g., “we,” ”him,” “my”), place (e.g., 
“here,” “those,” “upstairs”), time (e.g., “now,” “later,” “yesterday”), and discourse (e.g., “therefore,” “yes,” 
“however”), including exclamations or interjections (e.g., “oh,” “well,” “ok”). These deictic words are categorized 
as stop words and removed.  
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to identify contextual words by using grammatical categories, which include pronouns, adverbs, and 
interjections. Because pronouns and interjections are already excluded as stop words in the third step, in 
this step, we essentially remove high-frequency adverbs, such as “very,” “thus,” “really,” “actually,” and 
“basically.”31  
Moreover, because financial and technical terminology is common in conference calls and analyst reports, 
we convert high-frequency phrases that constitute specific financial/technical terms into one word (or its 
common abbreviation if there is one). For example, “target price” is converted into “target-price,” 
“balance sheet” into “balance-sheet,” “earnings per share” into “EPS,” and “cost of goods sold” into 
“COGS.” This step helps retain financial/technical terms’ accurate meanings and disambiguate 
polysemous words and abbreviations.  
Lastly, we remove S&P 500 company names and tickers to prevent LDA from identifying companies as 
topics.  
All of these preprocessing steps enhance the interpretability of the topics identified and reduce the 
computational burden of the LDA model. After these steps, we have approximately 303 million words in 
our corpus.  
C. Determining the parameters of the LDA algorithm 
The LDA algorithm we use is the “Stanford Topic Modeling Toolbox” developed by the Stanford Natural 
Language Processing Group (Ramage et al. 2009). It requires the researcher to set three parameters for the 
assumed statistical model including the total number of topics in the entire collection of documents, and  
and , which determines how smooth the topic and word distributions are, respectively (please see 
Internet Appendix I for a detailed explanation).  
 
The number of topics of the model affects the interpretability of the results. Setting the number too low 
can result in topics that are too broad and ambiguous. Conversely, setting the number too high may 
introduce economically meaningless topics. To select the optimal number of topics, we follow the 
computational linguistic literature and calculate the Perplexity Score of the LDA model based on different 
numbers of topics (Blei et al., 2003; Rosen-Zvi et al. 2004). The perplexity score measures the ability of 
an LDA model estimated on a subset of documents (training data) to predict the word choices in the 
remaining documents (testing data). It is defined as the exponential of the negative normalized predictive 
likelihood under the model. Accordingly, the perplexity score is monotonically decreasing in the 
likelihood of observing the testing data, given the model estimated from the training data. A lower 
perplexity score indicates that the model has better generalization performance. Formally, for a testing 







where  is the number of words in document ;  is a vector of all the words in document ; and 
 is the probability of observing the word vector  in document  given the LDA model estimated 
from the training data.  
 
                                                            
31 Note that we only remove stop words and contextual words for LDA because they are either meaningless (stop 
words) or just reflect linguistic styles (contextual words) and do not help identify economically meaningful topics. 
For tone classification using the naïve Bayes classification, we follow the procedures described in Huang et al. 
(2014) and do not remove contextual words. Other variables based on text, i.e., , , and 
, are calculated using original sentences.  
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Following the literature (Blei et al., 2003; Rosen-Zvi et al., 2004), we compute and plot the perplexity 
scores of the LDA model for different numbers of topics, ranging from 2 to 120. As Appendix Figure 2 
shows, the perplexity score improves with the number of topics, but the improvement is marginally 
decreasing. The improvement diminishes significantly once the number of topics exceeds 60. Therefore, 
we choose 60 as the number of topics in our corpus.32  
 
 
Appendix Figure 2. Perplexity of LDA model for different numbers of topics 
The choice of the values of  and  depends on the specific textual genre, the number of topics and the 
vocabulary size. We choose values of 0.1 and 0.01 for  and , respectively, based on the recommended 
values in the literature (Steyvers and Griffiths 2006; Kaplan and Vakili 2015).  
D. Constructing a topic vector of a document 
 
The output from the LDA algorithm is a topic-word probability matrix  in which an element, , is 
word ’s probability in topic . With the LDA output, we construct the topic vector ( ) of a document 
 using the following procedures:  First, for each sentence in , we sum the probabilities of its words in 
each topic to obtain this sentence’s probabilities in all topics. Next, we assign each sentence to the topic in 
which it has the highest probability.33 Lastly, we calculate the fraction of document  that is dedicated to 
topic  ( ) as document d’s proportion of sentences assigned to topic	 . Formally, the topic vector of 
document d is defined as 
	 	 	 , , … .  
 
                                                            
32 The suitable number of topics depends on the specific samples employed by different studies. For example, Ball et 
al. (2013) use 100 topics for MD&A text; Quinn et al. (2010) use 42 topics for political text; Atkins et al. (2012) use 
100 topics for couples-therapy transcripts. In addition to using the perplexity score, we also compare LDA outputs 
manually based on 30, 60, and 100 topics. Based on our comparison, we conclude that the LDA results with 60 
topics outperform other specifications in terms of its ability to identify economically important topics without 
generating too many uninterpretable topics.  
33 In a sensitivity test, we assign each sentence to three topics with the highest probabilities. Our empirical results 























Variable Name Definition 
 The number of sentences labeled by LDA as non-  topics in  scaled by 
the total number of sentences in .  topics are the topics in which the 
discussion length exceeds 2% of the . 
 The average of one minus within-topic cosine word similarity between  and 
 in the  topics. The within-topic cosine word similarity between  and 
 for a given topic  is calculated as 
∑ ∙
∑ ∙ ∑
, where,  is 
word ’s frequency in the discussion of topic  in ;  is word ’s 
frequency in the discussion of topic  in ;  is the total number of unique 
words in  and .  topics are the topics in which the discussion length 





_  and _  are the textual opinions of the 
sentences labeled by LDA as non-  and  topics in , respectively. 
_  ( _ ) is the textual opinion of 
the sentences labeled by LDA as  topics in  using new (similar) 
language. A topic is defined as using new language if the Pearson’s chi-square 
test for the homogeneity between  and  with respect to their word 
distributions in this topic is significant at the 10% level. The textual opinion of 
the sentences is calculated as the percentage of positive sentences minus the 
percentage of negative sentences as classified by the naïve Bayes approach 
(Huang et al. 2014). 
0,1  The cumulative abnormal return over the [0, 1] window relative to the 
conference call date, winsorized at the top and bottom 1%, where the 
abnormal return is calculated as the raw return minus the buy-and-hold return 
on the NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq value-weighted market index. 
_  The textual opinion of the sentences labeled by LDA as  topics in  
minus that of the same firm’s previous . The textual opinion of the 
sentences is calculated as the percentage of positive sentences minus the 
percentage of negative sentences as classified by the naïve Bayes approach 
(Huang et al. 2014). 
_   Earnings surprise, calculated as the actual EPS minus the last consensus EPS 
forecast before the earnings announcement date, both from I/B/E/S, scaled by 
the stock price 10 days prior to the earnings announcement date, winsorized at 
the top and bottom 1%. 
 An indicator variable that equals one if the actual EPS is less than the last 
consensus EPS forecast before the earnings announcement date, both from 
I/B/E/S, and zero otherwise. 
_  The cumulative 10-day abnormal returns ending two days before the 
conference call, winsorized at the top and bottom 1%, where abnormal return 
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is calculated as the raw return minus the buy-and-hold return on the 
NYSE/Amex/Nasdaq value-weighted market index. 
 The natural log of the market value of equity of the firm (CSHOQ×PRCCQ) 
at the end of the quarter prior to the conference call, winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1%. 
 The book value of equity (CEQ) scaled by the market value of equity 
(CSHOQ×PRCCQ) of the firm at the end of the quarter prior to the 
conference call, winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. 
# 	 The number of analyst reports issued on the day of or the day following the 
conference call. 
#  The natural log of one plus the number of questions raised by analysts in the 
conference call’s Q&A session. 
 Percentage of competition-related words in  in the firm’s previous 
conference call. Following Li et al. (2013), competition related words include 
“competition,” “competitor,” “competitive,” “compete,” and “competing.” We 
include words with an “s” appended and do not count words in phrases that 
contain negation, such as “less competitive,” and “few competitors.” 
 
 
The standard deviation of the monthly return of the firm in the 12 months 
prior to the conference call, winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. 
  The average experience of analysts who issue reports on the day of or the day 
following the conference call. Experience is measured as the number of years 
since the analyst first issued a forecast in I/B/E/S. 
  The number of analysts who are ranked as Institutional Investor All-Star 
analysts, scaled by the total number of analysts who issued reports on the day 
of or the day following the conference call. 
 The number of words in  that are in the Uncertainty word list created by 
Loughran and McDonald (2013), scaled by the total number of words in . 
 One minus the percentage of sentences that contain “$” or “%.” 
#  The natural log of a firm’s number of segments. 
_ _  The absolute value of the earnings surprise, calculated as the absolute value of 
the difference between the actual EPS and the last consensus EPS forecast 
before the earnings announcement date, both from I/B/E/S, scaled by the stock 
price 10 days prior to the earnings announcement date, winsorized at the top 
2%. 
_  The number of sentences in analyst reports issued on the day of or the day 




Temporal Variation in the Distribution of Key Topics 
This figure presents the relative weights in the five topics with the highest variability in the banking and 
telecommunication industries, along with their respective sector indices (Financial Sector SPDR – XLF 
and iShares US Telecommunications – IYZ respectively) in our sample period of 2003-2012.  




















































































































































































Equity issuance and TARP    
(capital,common,tarp,raise,preferred,     
equity, er,share,ra o,stock) 
Mortgage origina on    
(mortgage,gain,msr,sale,servicing,loan,     
origina on,business,earnings,hedging) 
Deteriora ng performance and losses 
(loss,credit,capital,expect,por olio,value,  
reserve,book,tangible,provision) 
Real estate loans    
(loan,por olio,commercial,real,estate,     
residen al,construc on,credit,consumer, 
home) 
Growth 
(loan,growth,up,increase,deposit,gain,    
annualized,fee,income,net) 
XLF (S&P Financial Select Sector Index) 
 



















































































































































































Smartphone business   
(iphone,smartphone,device,postpaid,lte,
upgrade, sales,expect,margin,subscriber) 
Landline related services     
(line,access,dsl,loss,revenue,add,decline,
net,wireless,ld) 
Wireless subscribers     
(add,net,postpaid,churn,arpu,es mate,  
prepaid,subscriber,gross,expect) 
Cash flow and capi al market 
transac ons    
(cash,dividend,flow,free,share,yield,     
stock,debt,buyback,repurchase) 
Financial performance compared to 
es mate and guidance     
(es mate,revenue,eps,ebitda,guidance, 
expect,result,lower,be er,below) 




Highest Probability Words in the Top Ten Topics of Two Large Industries 
This table reports the top 20 words in each of the top ten topics and our inferred topic labels for two of the five 
largest industries in terms of the total number of conference calls in our sample.  
Topic Label Top 20 Words 




margin, estimate, guidance, EPS, expect, consensus, operating, revenue, lower, consensus, 
sales, expectation, below, per-share, segment, management, forecast, in-line, beat, outlook 
Sales and revenue sales, improve, operating, margin, price, profit, revenue, estimate, decline, volume, share, 
segment, operating-income, improve, off-set, rise, lower, cost, currency, earnings 
Growth growth, revenue-growth, organic, strong, sales, digit, acquisition, business, rate, expect, EPS-
growth, strength, grow, line, margin, solid, core, single, segment, guidance 
Business outlook  business, expansion, good, term, margin, positive, looking, rate, big, difficult, customer, 
forward, guidance, market, pressure, area, line, opportunity, issue, new 
Financial outlook revenue, growth, operating, margin, segment, increase, business, expect, year-over-year, 
forecast, result, acquisition, higher, estimate, decline, compare, income, report, strong, EPS 
Valuation model multiple, price, stock, earnings, target-price, valuation, estimate, DCF (discount cash flow), 
cycle, risk, growth, EPS, current, price-to-earnings, group, relative, view, investor, peak, 
upside 
Defense contracts system, program, defense, contract, space, service, budget, electronic, aircraft, information, 
ship, missile, government, technology, international, sales, air, support, navy, DOD 
(Department of Defense) 
Cash flows and financing cash, flow, free, share, capital, net, dividend, debt, balance, repurchase, increase, strong, 
sheet, margin, stock, free-cash-flow, earnings, growth, program, cash-flow 
Raw materials and input 
price 
cost, price, increase, material, pricing, margin, higher, raw, volume, expect, incremental, 
inflation, impact, commodity, product, off-set, operating, steel, inventory, benefit 
Geographic segments market, growth, China, Europe, global, emerging, America, demand, region, Asia, India, 
investment, country, north, economy, expect, middle, economic, European, east 
Health Care Equipment & Services (3510) 
Growth growth, margin, revenue, expect, operating, business, rate, gross, digit, market, expansion, 
improvement, EPS, organic, mix, increase, drive, single, grow, new 
Earnings guidance and 
expectations 
estimate, EPS, guidance, share, expect, range, management, result, expectation, consensus, 
growth, earnings, impact, per-share, lower, new, in-line, revenue, report, stock 
Geographic segments sales, division, currency, constant, growth, report, expect, divisional, product, FX (foreign 
exchange), gross, rate, Europe, business, impact, margin, international, foreign, tax, Japan 
Income statement items income, net, revenue, expense, operating, after-tax, EPS, margin, gross, interest, share, cost, 
profit, rate, SG&A, dilute, pre-tax, amortization, item, adjust 
Valuation  estimate, EPS, target-price, multiple, price, share, risk, growth, valuation, price-to-earnings, 
stock, earnings, rating, base, trade, industry, group, forward, premium, peer 
Medical cost enrollment, MLR (medical loss rate), commercial, cost, trend, medical, earnings, share, 
Medicare, expect, ratio, membership, higher, prior, SG&A, live, projection, increase, report, 
premium 
Business outlook and 
opportunities 
business, positive, term, good, market, future, guidance, impact, looking, forward, rate, new, 
product, performance, opportunity, better, call, cost, issue, start 
Cash flow and financing cash, debt, flow, share, net, asset, capital, cash-flow, liability, repurchase, balance, equity, 
note, investment, free, free-cash-flow, stock, dividend, sheet, expense 
Medicare and Medicaid Medicare, plan, commercial, member, Medicaid, advantage, health, premium, care, benefit, 
cost, membership, group, enrollment, business, contract, government, risk, Tricare, 
individual 
Drug trial announce, disease, drug, product, category, treatment, trial, patient, update, system, new, 





Panel A presents the sample selection procedures for the earnings conference calls. Panel B presents the 
sample selection procedures for the analyst reports. Revision reports are analyst reports that contain a 
revision in at least one of the analysts’ quantitative measures (earnings forecast, stock recommendation, 
and target price).  
Panel A: Sample selection – earnings conference calls  
Earnings conference calls of S&P 500 firms in the 2003-2012 period 18,607 
Less earnings conference calls not on days [0, +1] relative to the earnings 
announcement dates 
371 
Less earnings conference calls without accompanying analyst reports 486 
Earnings conference calls on days [0, +1] relative to the earnings announcement 
dates, with accompanying analyst reports 
17,750 
Panel B: Sample selection – analyst reports  
 All Reports 
Revision 
Reports 
Analyst reports issued for S&P 500 firms in the 2003-2012 period 476,633 220,723 
Less analyst reports not within [0, +1] relative to the earnings 
conference call dates 
313,316 114,034 
Less analyst reports issued before the start time of the earnings 
conference calls 
4,107 4,107 
Number of analyst reports issued on days [0, +1] after the earnings 
conference calls (denoted, ) 
159,210 102,582 





This table reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analyses. Variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix III. 
Variables: # of obs. Mean Median Std Q1 Q3
 17,749 0.314 0.303 0.104 0.238 0.379
 17,749 0.540 0.538 0.082 0.483 0.593
_  17,731 0.188 0.193 0.159 0.094 0.289
_   17,749 0.217 0.223 0.178 0.100 0.343
_   17,480 0.213 0.221 0.214 0.083 0.355
_   17,694 0.224 0.231 0.205 0.100 0.357
  
Determinants of Discovery and Interpretation: 
 (%) 17,131 0.071 0.052 0.073 0.019 0.101
 17,724 0.086 0.074 0.048 0.053 0.104
 (%) 17,749 0.836 0.811 0.265 0.651 0.986
 (%) 17,749 80.699 79.412 7.961 74.038 84.615
#  17,749 0.751 0.693 0.747 0.000 1.386
 17,632 0.222 0.000 0.416 0.000 0.000
_  17,622 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.002
 17,327 8.016 7.859 2.423 6.424 9.400
 17,749 0.224 0.182 0.235 0.000 0.347
  
Other Variables: 
0,1  17,733 0.000 0.000 0.057 -0.030 0.030
_ 	 17,064 0.000 0.002 0.097 -0.061 0.063
#  17,749 3.045 3.135 0.577 2.833 3.367
_ _  17,622 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.003
_  17,749 359.909 320.000 227.985 187.000 487.000
_  17,699 0.003 0.002 0.049 -0.024 0.028
 17,723 9.339 9.233 1.083 8.594 9.952
 17,745 0.468 0.393 0.326 0.248 0.609




Investors’ Reaction to Analyst Information Discovery and Information Interpretation 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from estimating Eq. (1). All variables are 
defined in Appendix III. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are displayed 
in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
  Dependent Variable 
 0,1  
 
_  0.041*** 
 (10.9) 
_  0.061*** 
 (16.7) 
_  0.039*** 
 (7.9) 




_ ∗  -2.503*** 
 (-7.8) 











Year Fixed Effect Yes 
Observations 16,923 
Adjusted R2 0.138 
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 Table 5 
Determinants and Relative Value of Analyst Information Discovery and Information Interpretation 
Panel A: Determinants of the value of analyst information discovery and interpretation roles 
This panel reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from estimating Eq. (2). All variables are 
defined in Appendix III. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are displayed 
in parentheses on the right of the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
  Dependent Variable 
 0,1  
  
_  0.005 (0.6) 
_ ∗  0.002** (2.2) 
_ ∗  0.008*** (7.4) 
_ ∗  0.013* (1.7) 
_ ∗ _  -0.111 (-0.1) 
_ ∗  -0.002** (-2.0) 
_ ∗  0.000 (0.2) 
_  0.070*** (6.4) 
_ 	 ∗  0.038** (2.0) 
_ 	 ∗  0.001** (2.3) 
_ 	 ∗ #  -0.001 (-1.3) 
_ 	 ∗  -0.014** (-2.1) 
_ 	 ∗ _  -0.030 (-0.0) 
_ 	 ∗  0.001** (2.2) 
_ 	 ∗  -0.001 (-1.2) 
_  0.038*** (7.7) 
 -0.000 (-1.6) 
 -0.001*** (-4.2) 
 0.001** (2.1) 
 -0.000 (-0.9) 
#  -0.000 (-0.3) 
 -0.013*** (-6.3) 
_  2.893*** (8.0) 
_ 	 ∗ 	  -2.619*** (-6.4) 
 0.000 (1.3) 
 0.000 (1.2) 
_  -0.063*** (-5.0) 
	 -0.000 (-0.1) 
	 0.017*** (8.9) 
#  -0.000*** (-4.0) 
 -0.021*** (-3.1) 
   
Year Fixed Effect Yes  
Observations 16,615  
Adjusted R2 0.146  
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Panel B: The relative value of information discovery and information interpretation  
This panel reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics of the main variables from estimating Eq. (1). In Columns (1) and (2), (3) and (4), (5) 
and (6), and (7) and (8), we separately estimate Eq. (1) for sub-samples of conference calls in the bottom and top deciles in terms of , 
, , and , respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix III. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the 
firm and year levels are displayed in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
Dependent Variable 0,1  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 


















        
_  0.031*** 0.054*** 0.024*** 0.075*** 0.016* 0.026*** 0.044*** 0.039***
 (4.8) (5.1) (4.3) (4.9) (1.8) (2.7) (4.5) (3.3) 
_  0.054*** 0.057*** 0.041*** 0.071*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.045*** 0.056***
 (8.3) (5.9) (7.7) (4.6) (7.4) (7.0) (4.5) (4.9) 
         
F-test of equality between 
_  and 
_  
5.14** 0.03 3.19* 0.03 12.73*** 7.16*** 0.01 0.66* 
         
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,162 1,681 1,718 1,612 1,710 1,671 1,698 1,652 




Determinants of Analyst Information Discovery and Interpretation Roles 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from OLS regressions of  and 
 on their determinants and control variables. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix III. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are displayed in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
  Dependent Variables 
   
  (1) (2) 
    
  0.027**  
  (2.4)  
  0.096***  
  (4.0)  
  0.021*** 
 (4.1) 
  0.001*** 
 (7.7) 
#    0.000 
   (0.2) 
  0.005*** 0.000 
  (3.2) (0.0) 
_ _   -0.103 0.165 
   (-0.4) (0.6) 
  -0.002* -0.002 
  (-1.9) (-0.2) 
  0.005 0.010 
   (0.8) (0.6) 
#   0.001 -0.009*** 
  (0.6) (-3.4) 
  0.005*** -0.000 
 (3.3) (-0.3) 
  -0.004 -0.001 
 (-0.8) (-0.4) 
_   -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (-0.6) (-17.6) 
#   0.000 -0.001** 
 (0.4) (-2.4) 
  0.262*** 0.536*** 
 (14.5) (23.3) 
Industry and Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
    
Observations  16,704 17,291 
Adjusted R2  0.190 0.415 
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Table 7 
Investors’ Value of Analyst Information Discovery and Interpretation Efforts 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from estimating Eq. (3). All variables are 
defined in Appendix III. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are displayed 
in parentheses to the right of the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
  Dependent Variable 
 0,1  
  
_  -0.008 (-1.0) 
_ 	 ∗ 	  0.173*** (6.5) 
 -0.014* (-1.9) 
_  -0.016 (-0.9) 
_ 	 ∗ 1  0.209*** (6.3) 
_ 	 ∗ 1 ∗  0.184*** (4.1) 
_  -0.016 (-0.5) 
_ 	 ∗ 	  0.101* (1.8) 
 0.029** (2.4) 
	 ∗ 	  -0.008 (-0.5) 
_ 	 ∗ 	  -0.761 (-0.4) 
 -0.008 (-0.9) 
_  1.683 (1.4) 
_  -0.060*** (-4.7) 
	 -0.001* (-1.7) 
	 0.022*** (11.6) 
#  -0.000*** (-2.8) 
 -0.028*** (-3.0) 
   
Year Fixed Effect Yes  
Observations 16,923  





Investors’ Reaction to Analyst Information Discovery, New Language, and Confirmation 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and t-statistics from estimating Eq. (4). All variables are 
defined in Appendix III. t-stats based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year levels are displayed 
in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively, using two-tailed tests. 
 
  Dependent Variable 
 0,1  
  
_  0.049*** 
 (12.2) 








_  1.297*** 
 (8.0) 











Year Fixed Effect Yes 
Observations 16,627 
Adjusted R2 0.130 
 
 
 
